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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE
Name:

Facility:

Copeland, Phillip

Appeal

NYSID:
DIN:

Control No.:

Wende CF

02-048-19 B

89-A-5229

Appearances:

Stephen K. Underwood, Esq.
1395 Union Rd.
West Seneca, NY 14224

Decision appealed:

February 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24
months.

Board Member(s)
who participated:

Coppola, Crangle

Papers considered:

Appellant's Briefreceived June 10, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Re.commendation

Records relied upon:

Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole
Board Release Decision Notice (Fonn 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case

Plan.
F~µ~l D~termination:

The undersigned determine that the dec'isi~n appealed is hereby:

,1

V"Affirmed

A
..

_·_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ __

~ffirmed

_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to - - - -

-~med

_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ __

Co · issioner

l1 vrc.-~
Commissioner

If the Final Determination is ·at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals .Unit, written
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit' s Findings and the separate findings .o f
the Parole Board, if ~ny,. were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ;7.;/;1_//2· /{ .

Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)
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Appellant challenges the February 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and
imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant contends: (1) the Board’s denial of release was error in
light of the COMPAS instrument scales; (2) the Offender Case Plan considered by the Board
fails to comport with the requirements of Correction Law § 71-a; (3) the Board’s determination
was bases solely on the severity of the offense and, therefore, was arbitrary and capricious; (4)
the Board failed to consider all factors required by statute and, therefore, was arbitrary and
capricious; (5) the Board’s decision was insufficiently detailed; and (6) appellant was denied due
process because the Board’s deliberations were not recorded.
Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the
law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate
the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the
Board to consider criteria which are relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to,
the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State
Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is
discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the
Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d
872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of
Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st
Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them
equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept.
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st
Dept. 2007).
Here, the record reflects that, during the interview, the Board discussed the instant offence,
which involved the murder of a police officer guarding a witness to the sale of drugs by the
criminal organization to which appellant belonged. The officer’s presence had been necessitated
by death threats and the firebombing of the witness’s home in retaliation for complaining to the
police about drug dealing in front of his residence. The police placed the witness under 24-hour
protection. After the police arrested the individuals responsible for these crimes, the head of
appellant’s organization ordered a retaliatory “hit” upon the police. Thereafter, appellant and his
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codefendants planned and committed the murder of a police officer stationed in a patrol car in
front of the witness’s residence. Appellant and his codefendants approached the vehicle from the
rear and shot the 22-year-old victim multiple times, killing him before he was able to act to
protect himself.
The record further reflects that the Board considered, in addition to the severity of the offense,
appellant’s institutional record, including his disciplinary history, vocational training and
program participation, as well as appellant’s Case Plan and his COMPAS risk and needs
assessment. The Board also considered appellant’s character references, and release plans. The
record further reflects consideration of statements made supporting release and statements made
opposing release. The statements opposing release included multiple statements of the District
Attorney and of the Sentencing Court. In particular, the District Attorney has strenuously
opposed release and the Sentencing Court made a “recommendation to the parole board that you
are never paroled” at sentencing, a recommendation which has been reiterated in subsequent
letters to the Board.
In its decision, the Board noted appellant’s relatively good disciplinary history, his program
participation and his low scores on the COMPAS risk and needs assessment, but concluded that
the gravity of the offense was such that release would not be appropriate, noting the presence of
significant aggravating factors. In particular, the Board highlighted the callousness of the murder
and the fact that this murder was committed in retaliation for legitimate police activity in
protecting a witness terrorized by a criminal organization. Thus, the Board determined that,
because release would be “incompatible with the welfare of society” and would “so deprecate the
seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law,” denial was warranted. Executive Law
§ 259-i (2)(c)(A).
Appellant now challenges the Board’s decision denying release and imposing a 24-month hold.
Appellant’s first contention, that the Board’s determination denying parole despite appellant’s
low scores on the COMPAS instrument failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to Executive
Law § 259-c (4), is without merit.
The 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The
amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to
apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the
COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26
N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the
Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three
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standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107,
1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059,
994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021,
56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.
Appellant’s second contention, the Offender Case Plan considered by the Board fails to comport
with the requirements of Correction Law § 71-a, is without merit. “Correction Law § 71-a
specifically directs DOCCS, not the Board, to develop a TAP to facilitate an inmate's eventual
transition back into society. The Board is then expected to utilize the TAP, ‘where available,’ as
part of its evaluation in determining an inmate’s suitability for parole release.” Matter of Rivera
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1108-09, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 296, quoting Matter of
Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 24
N.Y.3d 1052, 1053, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014). Thus, the Board satisfied its obligation to
consider the available case plan.
Appellant’s third contention, that the Board’s decision was improperly based solely on the
severity of the offense, is without merit.
As discussed above, the Board properly considered the applicable factors, including extreme
gravity of the crime; the execution of a police officer stationed outside the home of a witness
who had been subjected to death threats and the firebombing of his residence as a result of
reporting the illegal activity of the organization to which appellant belonged. As the weight to be
assigned each statutory factor is within the Board’s discretion, it committed no error by
emphasizing the severity of the inmate’s offense over the other factors it properly considered.
See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d
235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision,
151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d
1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385, 772
N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 2004); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52
(1st Dept. 1998).
While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on
an inmate’s crime, (Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714), there are multiple
aggravating factors present here; appellant’s crimes went “well beyond the ‘unjustifiable taking
and tragic loss of life’” that describes every murder. Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d
at 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 125. Appellant’s offense represented an attempt by a criminal
organization to retaliate against the police for acting to thwart the organization’s attempts to
intimidate a witness to its crimes. Thus, the crime represented an attack on the rule of law as well
as a particularly cold-blooded murder in its own right.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name:

Copeland, Phillip

Facility: Wende CF

DIN:

89-A-5229

AC No.: 02-048-19 B

Findings: (Page 4 of 5)
It should also be noted that a significant portion of discussion of the instant offense was occupied
by appellant’s claims of innocence and his complaints regarding conduct of the criminal
proceedings. While appellant is free to pursue whatever further challenges to the underlying
convictions are still available, at the present moment these claims are contradicted by the results
his direct appeal of the conviction (People v. Copeland, 197 A.D.2d 629, 602 N.Y.S.2d 683, (2d
Dept. 1993), lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 903, 610 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1993)) and his federal habeas corpus
challenge (Copeland v. Walker, 258 F. Supp. 2d 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). Moreover, as the Third
Department noted in its rejection of appellant’s prior challenge to a Board determination, “‘it is
generally not [respondent's] role to reevaluate a claim of innocence’” Matter of Copeland v. N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 1158, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548, 550 (3d Dept. 2017.), quoting
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704.
Thus, the Board properly based its account of the instant offense on the Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report, upon which it is entitled to rely. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d)(7); Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291,
293 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011). See also Matter of Dolan
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (3d Dept.
2014) (finding no “indication that respondent erroneously considered petitioner’s presentence
investigation report, given that petitioner did not timely challenge the accuracy of any of the
information in that report”), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 915, 4 N.Y.S.3d 601 (2015).
Appellant’s fourth contention, the Board failed to properly consider all factors required by
statute, is similarly without merit. As discussed above, the record reflects that the Board
considered all applicable factors. That the Board found Appellant’s postconviction activities
outweighed by the serious nature of his crimes does not constitute convincing evidence that the
Board did not consider them (see Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994)), or render the decision irrational (see Matter of
Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d at 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 418).
Appellant’s fifth contention, that the Board’s decision was insufficiently detailed, is without
merit. The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the
denial of parole, particularly when evaluated in the context of the interview transcript. Matter of
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 778, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602, 602 (2008); Matter of Applegate
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter
of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept.
2013).
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Appellant sixth contention, that he was denied due process because the Board’s deliberations
were not disclosed or recorded, is without merit. Contrary to his assertion, the Board is not
required to record its internal deliberations or discussions. Matter of Barnes v. New York State
Div. of Parole, 53 A.D.3d 1012, 862 N.Y.S.2d 639 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Borcsok v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 961, 823 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Collins
v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733, 465 N.Y.S.2d 84 (4th Dept. 1983).
Consequently, appellant’s challenge the Board’s decision denying release is unavailing.
Recommendation:

Affirm.

